Major cyber risks appear on government risk registers but are not always understood by senior leaders or linked to strategic objectives, the National Audit Office (NAO) has found.
Launching the NAO's value for money report, Risk management in government: improving capability and decision-making (HC 768), published on 18 November 2026, the head of the NAO, Gareth Davies, said that government must place risk management "at the heart of how it plans, spends and delivers".
On cyber security, the NAO says legacy technology and difficulty recruiting and keeping specialist staff may prevent departments from bringing cyber risks within appetite. Audit and Risk Assurance Committees often lack cyber security expertise, and the same gap is identified for artificial intelligence. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has trained committee chairs at arm's-length bodies on cyber security.
The reported cited two incidents as examples of the issues. The British Library had identified third-party access risks and planned stronger controls before the October 2023 cyberattack, but the attack came before those controls were in place. In the Afghan data breach, the report says the Ministry of Defence prioritised speed over robust data handling systems and did not formally reassess that approach once the crisis had passed, which contributed to significant data security breaches involving more than 18,500 applications.
The report made a number of recommendations on the public sector's management of risk more generally, These included:
- closer engagement by the Risk Centre of Excellence with other functions and professions, so that digital, commercial, financial and policy decisions are informed by risk
- regular review and challenge of the risk improvement plans of departments and large arm's-length bodies
- role-specific risk training expectations for new non-executive directors, senior civil servants and permanent secretaries
- a clear approach, as devolution develops, to risks that cut across organisational, geographical and policy boundaries
Risk management in central government is framed by HM Treasury's Orange Book, the corporate governance code for central government departments and the government functional standards. The Risk Centre of Excellence, hosted by HM Treasury, publishes supporting guidance, including on risk reporting and on relationships between departments and arm's-length bodies.
On systems and data, about a third of the 17 main departments were still tracking risks manually in September 2026. Where bodies have moved to risk management information systems, those systems still depend on staff entering accurate information. Principal risk reporting is often qualitative even where quantitative data could help, and bodies are not making full use of performance information or early-warning indicators.
Oversight of arm's-length bodies is described as inconsistent, and the Government Internal Audit Agency found no consistent way to aggregate their risks or define escalation. Several bodies lack visibility of supplier risks, particularly in multi-tier supply chains, and only 31% of surveyed risk professionals use interdependency mapping.
The survey, carried out between April and June 2026, drew answers from 62 risk professionals in departments and arm's-length bodies. Of those, 58% said they were involved too late in major decisions or not at all.
The Risk Centre of Excellence is piloting AI agents for horizon scanning and assurance mapping, and the Rural Payments Agency uses AI to analyse risk data for senior leaders. The NAO also notes that many bodies review incidents and near misses in cyber security and data protection.
