The First-tier Tribunal has dismissed an appeal against East Lindsey District Council's refusal to disclose correspondence about the collapse of North Thoresby, Grainsby and Waithe Parish Council, holding that the council's handling of conduct complaints against parish councillors was a function within section 31(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 even though no formal investigation into the collapse had ever taken place.
In Billy Buckenham v The Information Commissioner and East Lindsey District CouncilBilly Buckenham v The Information Commissioner and East Lindsey District Council [2026] UKFTT 1283 (GRC), Judge Kiai, with members Wolf and Scott, upheld Decision Notice IC-312328-M6Q2, in which the Commissioner had found the withheld information exempt under section 31(1)(g) read with section 31(2)(a) and (b).
The request, made on 8 February 2024, followed the resignation of most of the parish council's members and its clerk in the early months of that year, which left the council inquorate and drew in the district council. Buckenham sought emails and documents relating to the resignations and to communications involving ELDC officers and councillors in the period from 31 January to 8 February 2024. ELDC disclosed some material and withheld the remainder.
Buckenham's central argument throughout was that there was no investigation and never had been, so there was no function capable of being prejudiced. He relied on a February 2025 email from ELDC legal officer Alison Sparks stating that the Monitoring Officer did not have power to investigate all matters relating to a parish council or councillor and could not investigate criminal allegations or breaches of the law, on section 5 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to argue that ELDC was not the relevant authority, and on the Local Government Association model code of conduct and complaints guidance to argue that complaints against councillors could not remain open after resignation. He also contended that ELDC had mischaracterised its powers and misled the Commissioner.
Section 31(1)(g) exempts information whose disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the exercise by any public authority of its functions for the purposes in section 31(2), which include ascertaining whether any person has failed to comply with the law and whether any person is responsible for improper conduct.
It is a qualified, prejudice-based exemption: the tribunal must identify the function, determine whether it was being exercised at the time of the request, assess whether disclosure would be likely to prejudice it, and if so apply the public interest test under section 2(2)(b).
The tribunal treated the "no investigation" point as sufficiently serious that a panel due to decide the case in December 2025 instead issued directions joining ELDC as second respondent and requiring both respondents to explain whether investigations had been undertaken, were ongoing or might occur.
ELDC's response distinguished between an investigation into the collapse of the parish council, which it said it had never conducted, and conduct complaints against individual councillors, which it said had been received and remained under consideration through its Monitoring Officer and Deputy Monitoring Officer functions. Following a case compliance hearing before Registrar Bamawo in March 2026, the appeal was determined on the papers on 2 June.
The tribunal found that much of the disagreement arose from the parties using the word "investigation" to mean different things: Buckenham a comprehensive inquiry into the collapse, ELDC the broader receipt, assessment and consideration of complaints.
Read fairly, the Sparks email identified the limits of the Monitoring Officer's role rather than denying its existence, and expressly confirmed the power to investigate code of conduct matters. The tribunal held it unnecessary to resolve the disputes over the 1989 Act, the Localism Act 2011 or the effect of resignation on complaints.
A matter could be before an authority and under consideration, including consideration of what if any further action could be taken, regardless of whether it could ultimately proceed to a particular outcome, and the functions in section 31(2) were not confined to formal investigations. On the open and closed material, complaints and allegations had been brought to ELDC's attention and were under active consideration at the material time.
On prejudice, the tribunal gave three reasons for finding a real and significant risk. Much of the withheld material consisted of information supplied by individuals about the conduct of others, and disclosure during the currency of the dispute would discourage future candour. The material showed personal conflict well beyond that in routine administrative disputes. And disclosure would inhibit officers' ability to receive and assess complaint information.
The tribunal said this was not a generic chilling effect argument but arose from the specific character of the material and circumstances. Later explanations given by ELDC officers did not amount to disclosure of the withheld communications, and the position fell to be assessed as at the date of the request.
The tribunal accepted substantial public interest in disclosure, including the collapse of a parish council, the way authority was exercised in the period after the resignations and the accountability of Monitoring Officers, and rejected any suggestion that Buckenham's interest was merely private.
Against that it weighed the interest in individuals being willing to bring complaints, the effective operation of conduct processes and the heightened antagonism in this case. Having read the withheld material, it was not persuaded that disclosure would materially advance understanding of the governance and website administration concerns Buckenham had raised, and noted that substantial third-party redaction would in any event leave an incomplete account. The balance favoured maintaining the exemption. The tribunal found no evidence that ELDC had deliberately misled the Commissioner or the tribunal, attributing the dispute to differing understandings of the scope of its activities.
The decision also addresses the closed material at length. No formal gist of the material withheld under rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 was produced during the proceedings. The tribunal considered whether a fuller open description could be given, concluded it could not without disclosing the material itself, and satisfied itself that the issues had been fully ventilated in open proceedings, that it had not used the closed material to introduce any new issue or factual case, and that its conclusions did not depend on any decisive proposition unknown to the appellant. The rule 14 restrictions were maintained.
